



Is there a correlation between European policies toward immigrants and the increasing number of 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants joining terrorist groups?

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Context / Figures and Fact section

The 9/11 terrorist acts in the USA unleashed a record wave of policymaking within the European Union. Before this attack, jihadi terrorism had been primarily associated with violence within the Muslim world¹. Terrorism became a political window of opportunity and with those European countries intensified their counter-terrorism policy leading to more restrictive legislation toward foreigners, thus limiting immigrants' liberties in order to prevent terrorist attacks. For example, the EU gained power in order to facilitate cross border cooperation by the multiple law-enforcement authorities and agencies. As a response to the events of 2001, the EU has become in less than 20 years a key resource for the fight against terrorism in the West.

In parallel, the Arab Spring and conflicts in the Middle East, in the last decade, have increased the numbers of refugees and illegal migrant arriving in European countries. This wave of migration allowed terrorists' organizations to smuggle its members to Europe in order to prepare terrorists attack from within.

While terrorists have been for a long time depicted as foreigners arriving from marginalized countries, it is not the case anymore as more Europeans and westerners are joining terrorist organizations, taking with them their freedom to travel internationally without being subjected to rigorous controls.

European point of view:

- Inclusion policies within the EU

“The EU is home to 21.6 million third-country nationals, accounting for 4.2% of the total EU population”². Most migrants coming within the EU are likely to stay in the midterm. It is therefore important to implement strategies in order to allow a successful integration.

¹ Baker, Edwin. 2006, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe.

² European Union. “Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion.” European Commission, 2018.

Europe is facing a paradox: demographic aging and the fight against illegal immigration. While the first, pushes the EU to pursue immigration policies, the other considers immigration as a threat to society. Each European country must deal with these contradictions, while the EU encourages its members to harmonize their migration policies.

European countries converged slowly toward common migration policy, first with the Schengen Agreements in 1985, than with the Dublin Convention in 1990 regarding the conditions for examining asylum applications and finally with the Hague Agreements in 2014, which harmonized the fight against irregular immigration and tighten entry conditions.

With that being said, non-EU migrants face gaps that are more important during their integration. This is most likely due to “lagging behind in education, language barriers, discrimination, uneven access to employment and decent housing and social services or mismatching jobs and over qualification in the case of highly educated migrants”³.

Even though, migration policies are a national competence, EU institutions can and are supporting the integration of migrants within the labor markets and societies. In fact, in 2015 the European Commission put in place a European Agenda on Migration. The agenda regroups multiple response and concrete action toward migration such as: “

- Saving lives at sea
- Targeting criminal smuggling networks
- Relocation in response to high volumes of arrivals within the EU
- Securing external borders
- Coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum system
- Effective integration”⁴

Following the Agenda, the Commission has been able to introduce in 2016 an Action Plan to the Integration of Third Country National⁵ and reinforce its cooperation with partners outside of its borders.

The EU has also put in place strategies and policies for the inclusion of migrants and refugees in cities. The Partnership of the Urban Agenda for the EU on the inclusion of migrants and refugees has allowed bringing together cities, countries and civil society organizations in order to develop common actions for a better integration. Different project were put in place such as the establishment of the

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ European Commission, 2015, A European Agenda on Migration.

⁵ European Commission, 2016, Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country Nationals.

Multi-cultural Educational and Care Center in the Netherlands as well as the European Voluntary Service that helps to mobilize networks sharing concrete practices for the integration of refugees and a plan to Promote the participation of migrants and their descendants⁶.

“The Europeanisation of migration policies is coupled with a great diversity of situations and political responses of welcome countries which often prefer the policy of opting out before implanting European measures”⁷.

On the 23rd of September 2020, and in response to the 2015 migration crisis, a new Pact on Migration and Asylum was presented in order to constitute a proper single cohesive migration policy, said Margaritis Schinas, commissioner for Promoting the European Way of Life and Asylum. If the Pact is implemented a few changes can be expected⁸.

The Pact will revise the Dublin regulation known as the principle of making the first country of entry of a migrant into the EU responsible for processing his asylum application. The country responsible would be the one where the migrant has a relative, or in which he has worked or studied. It could also be the country where a visa was issued. Otherwise, the Dublin regulation will remain. For countries under migratory pressure, a solidarity mechanism will be accessible. In this case, the European executive will assess the number of migrants to be taken care of.

Outside of Europe, controls will be stricter, with mandatory checks on all borders. All arrivals will be subject to rigorous identity verification. The EU is aiming to accelerate the process to remove migrants who are unlikely to obtain international protection, in parallel it is aiming for increased efficiency in the returns of illegal migrants to their country of origin, notably through the appointment of a coordinator and the intensification of negotiations with the State of origin.

A solidarity mechanism is also planned for rescues carried out by humanitarian ships. The plan proposes to shield NGOs rescuing migrants at sea from prosecution.

➤ Inclusions policies in France

⁶ O’Flaherty, Michael. 2017, Promoting the Participation of Migrants and Their Descendants. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.

⁷ Wihol, Catherine. 2008, L’Europe, Un Continent d’Immigration Malgré Lui. pp. 59-71.

⁸ European Commission, “New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Questions and Answers.” European Commission.

“The introduction of civic integration policies in France has to be read in the light of debates developed around the risk of ‘failed integration’, ‘communitarianism’ and the concept of secularism”⁹.

The appearance of an integration policy for foreigners or immigrants, in France, is recent. Before the 70’s, foreigners were seen as a workforce not intended to settle.

In response to the economic crisis, the cessation of labor immigration led to a drop of inflow of foreigners. However, the foreigners present on the territory had the chance to bring their families. Immigrants were not seen as labor forces anymore, but as inhabitants of the city. With this new dynamic, France implemented new actions to meet the need of this arriving population.

By the end of the 70’s, a National office for the promotion of immigrants’ culture is created to promote the culture and languages of immigrants. At the same time, a return to the country of origin is encouraged through a return assistance policy. With the arrival of the left, an agency is created in the 80’s to help develop intercultural relations, as well as a residence permit without any geographic or professional restriction. While discrimination is increasing towards immigrants, the integration of foreign populations is becoming an important element of city policy.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, migratory flows have been fairly substantial, while being variable. Each year, 200 000 new migrants arrive, making France the second country of European immigration.

In the mid-2000s, there is a will to welcome new arrivals through a real integration policy. However, by 2018, there is no real policy set in place, except for the Reception and Integration Contract¹⁰. Through this contract, the migrant’s empowerment is put forward through a contractualisation of the State-migrant relationship. It is now a mandatory factor in obtaining the first renewal of the temporary residence permit and subsequently, of the 10-year resident permit. With the migratory flow linked to family reunification came the will to introduce more demanding criteria with the objective of regulating new migrants. There is a shift from endured immigration to a chosen immigration. According to the government, the latter will allow a more successful migration.

⁹ Caponio, Tiziana. “L’Intégration : Nouvelle Frontière De l’Immigration ?” *Migrations Société*, vol. 140, 2012, pp. 285–294.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

While France has not succeeded in making integration a selection criterion, there is a system aimed at integration providing training beyond geographical borders, through consulates or the Alliance Française for example.

➤ Inclusion policies in Germany

Following the industrial boom, Germany signed bilateral agreements with different countries to recruit foreign workforce. But it was only in 1978 when the government realized that guest workers were permanently settled that the Federal Government appointed a Commissioner for the integration of Foreign Workers and their Family Members. It was with the Commission that Germany became a country of immigration. Today, migrant represent approximately 7% of the total population, most coming from Turkey, Syria and Russia¹¹.

By 2005, a systematic integration policy was established through two integration plans:

- The National Integration Plan of 2007 focusing on education, training, employment and cultural integration.
- The National Action Plan on Integration of 2012 creating instruments to measure the results of integration policies.

The two national plans set in place a program that include language courses, civic education and vocational training. Refugees' employment and children's integration are just a few examples of how integration is measured.

Furthermore, a recognition of Foreign professional qualifications was set in place. This Act entitles foreign skilled professionals to review of their vocational qualifications for equivalence with the corresponding German professions¹².

In 2012, a report was published by the Expert Council in order to examine the cooperation between different governance levels of integration policy and made recommendations for future actions as there is no centrally defined and locally enforced city policy in Germany. For the integration of immigrants through education and urban renewal, the principal of subsidiarity predominates, making harder to harmonize the integration within the country.

Through an annual Integration Summit organized by the Federal Chancellery, the civil society has played a very important role in the integration process in Germany.

Regarding the naturalization of immigrants and despite the existence of many exceptions especially for citizens of the EU, dual nationality is not accepted in

¹¹ European Union. "Governance of Migrant Integration in Germany." European Web Site on Integration.

¹² Federal Ministry of Education and Research. "Recognition of Foreign Professional Qualifications." BMBWF.

Germany. Young people born in Germany to foreign parents must opt for one or the other before the age of 24. Thus, the proportion of young people born on the soil of the host country and possessing their nationality is significantly lower in Germany than in France.

Despite different national traditions, the French and German conceptions of the integration of immigrants and their descendants have converged. Today, both countries have specific bodies responsible for the integration of news arrivals. However, while the first focuses on policies against discrimination and urban segregation, the other is more concerned with policies regarding nationality and the fight against educational inequalities.

- Prevention of terrorism and counterterrorism strategies in and outside the EU borders

Article 3 (2) TEU establishes that the Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice by preventing and combating crime. To implement Article 3 (2) TEU, the TFEU specifies that the EU has competence in the field of criminal law.

Knowing that, the EU has adopted a global approach to deal with the phenomena of foreign fighters and terrorism, through a network to prevent terrorism and a center to counter it.

In 2007, the Council of Europe adopted a Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism in order to increase the effectiveness of existing international texts on the fight against terrorism. Through 32 articles, this Convention was ratified in order to strengthen member States' efforts to prevent terrorism by establishing as criminal offences certain acts that may lead to the commission of terrorist offences and by reinforcing co-operation on prevention internally and internationally¹³.

Without internal frontiers, the EU aims to protect its population as well as allowing them to live freely. The main threat to those aims is terrorism. The EU has therefore developed a holistic counter-terrorism response. Adopted in 2005, the strategy pushes countries to fight against terrorism globally while respecting freedom and human rights. The strategy is built around four main points: “

- Prevent its population from turning to terrorism and stop next generations of terrorists from emerging
- Protect citizens and important infrastructure by reducing vulnerabilities against attacks
- Pursue and investigate terrorists, bring terrorists to justice

¹³ Council of Europe. “Convention Du Conseil De L'Europe Pour La Prévention Du Terrorisme.” Treaty Office.

- Respond in a coordinated way by preparing the consequences of a terrorist attack¹⁴.

Following the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack, the Commission established a European Counter Terrorism Center at Europol to improve the exchange of information and the operational support to Member States' investigators.

In parallel, in May 2015, the Council and the European Parliament adopted new rules to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. In March 2017, the EU adopted the Directive on combatting terrorism. This reinforces the legal framework so that it covers more comprehensively conduct related to terrorism. On September 2020, the Commission adopted a Report assessing the measures that Member States have taken to comply with the EU Directive on combating terrorism.

The security of the Union is also linked to the stability outside Europe and especially immediate neighborhood. It is the European Agenda on Security on the Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy for the EU highlight this internal-external security nexus and prioritize cooperation with the Western Balkans, Turkey, the Middle East and North Africa¹⁵. The UE cooperates with multiple international organizations and various strategic partners in order to fight against terrorism.

The competence on addressing terrorism is divided between Member States and the EU, therefore the EU legal framework is only a patchwork of secondary legislation.

Implications:

- Fatal attraction: 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants in Europe are joining ISIS and other jihadi groups

In the 80s, immigrants from Morocco, Pakistan or Turkey were not perceived as immigrants seeking for but, as Muslims, eventually threatening the social construction of European societies. The multiplication of terrorist attacks by Islamist fanatics and the radicalization of native Muslim Europeans added to the sentiment of anti-Muslim growing in Europe. Such a situation fuels Islamophobia, on one hand, as well as radicalization, on the other. In this context, European states are enacting law to combat extremist forces, making integration policies inconsistent. By producing a narrative that divides, Muslims in Europe are facing economic marginalization when the majority of them want to live in peace. Today

¹⁴ European Commission, Counter terrorism and radicalization.

¹⁵ European Commission, Counter terrorism and radicalization.

Islamic terrorist groups adopt the jihad as a political and social philosophy¹⁶, thus threatening both Muslims and non-Muslims.

A few phenomena can explain the radicalization of immigrants: the local connections, the identity rupture and the exposure of 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants to images of violence in many Muslim countries.

With the exception of France, it was not until the Madrid bombings – committed by terrorists that had been living in Spain for years – that the feeling of being under attack by an outside force emerged. European countries started combatting outside threats to prevent from another jihadi attack, without realizing that such a threat could also come from inside, as the number of radicalized members of Muslim communities within Europe was growing.

We can find multiple jihadi networks in Europe, all different in terms of size, organization, or geographic distribution of operations. While they may differ in some parts, they also have resemblances. Most networks are of a civilian nature, they operate within Europe – targeting capitals – and they have been using explosives as their modus operandi, both homemade and industrial. It is important to note that even though jihadi networks are diverse, within each network its composition is usually homogenous in terms of geographic distribution, age, and descent.

The members of jihadi networks – with a majority of men – come mostly from Arab-speaking countries, especially from North Africa, however they have been established in Europe for a few years or are from Arab descent. 2nd or 3rd generation immigrants represent most individuals joining jihadi groups in Europe. Whereas their descents are not European, these persons were born and raised in Europe. Regarding the socio-economic status, most of the members come from the middle and the lower class – thus reflecting the general socio-economic background of Muslim communities in Europe. A third of the individuals also have criminal records.

Though members were not born and raised with a particularly religious background, their faith grew at a later age – increasing a few months before the recruitment process within their countries of residence – through Coran classes, extremism mosques or internet propaganda. Social affiliation also plays a role in the recruitment, as members were usually friends or acquaintances at the time of their joining, and sometimes from the same family. Most jihadi terrorists in

¹⁶ Baker, Edwin. 2006, Jihadi Terrorists in Europe. Netherlands institute of international relations.

Europe joined the jihadi networks with very limited or no outside intrusion¹⁷, in comparison to global Salafi networks.

While it was assumed that jihadi members were recruited amongst men that were cut off from their original roots – as it is the case outside of the continent ; in Europe, most come from 2nd or 3rd generations of immigrants not far from their relatives and in many ways at home in the countries of recruitment.

There is no standard jihadi terrorist, with a few common traits both at the individual level and at the network level. In short, jihadism has neither economic nor educational roots causes¹⁸. While the size of the Muslim is the only common trait it is too broad to fight against jihadi.

- Returnees: European terrorists are being held in camps in Syria and imprisoned in Iraq

42 000 foreign terrorist fighters, from more than 120 countries joined terrorist organizations between 2011 and 2016, of which +/-5 000 came from Europe. Many returnees – men, often involved in and exposed to war atrocities, women, involved in the recruitment process and children – indoctrinated and recruited at an early age, have trauma and emotional issues.

Some were able to return to their native country, however many of them are being imprisoned in Iraq or in detention centers in Northern Syria. Conditions in Syrian camps are frantic. With a lack of sanitation, inadequate medical facilities and trauma among young children, the most radical residents have taken control of these camps¹⁹.

EU members remain extremely reluctant to bring these detainees back, letting returnees being tried by Iraqi courts or international tribunal. So far, the European politics is governed by a determination to not bring them back – keeping away their own citizens. As French foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has said, “French nationals who fought for Daesh fought against France. Therefore, they are enemies.” But the Islamic State was not recognized by any country, and the opposing coalition eventually reconquered all the territory it controls²⁰. Other countries, such as Britain and Germany are preventing them from returning by revoking their citizenship.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Voortman, Aude. Student Paper Series, 2015, Terrorism in Europe. Institut Barcelona Estudis Internacionals.

¹⁹ Moaveni, Azadeh. “I’m Going to Be Honest, This Baby Is Going to Die!” The New York Times. 2019.

²⁰ Barral, Clemence. “Jean-Yves Le Drian Sur Les Djihadistes Français De Daech: ‘Ce Sont Des Ennemis.’” Le Figaro.fr. 2019.

Following the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 2178 in 2014, which required states to pass laws to suppress foreign fighters, most European countries now have legislation that would allow the prosecution of returnees for belonging to or supporting a terrorist group. In reality, the sentences available for those convicted are limited to a few years' imprisonment, the average being five years for Belgium and Germany – France being the exception for imposing relatively long sentences.

European officials have frequently said that the most appropriate place for foreign fighters to be tried is in the region where they committed their crimes. This approach sounds reasonable in theory, but it would not justify trials that would likely be unfair, nor long delays in delivering justice or releasing anyone who is acquitted²¹. While it might be more practical to conduct trials in Iraq, it should not be used as a pretext to violate due process and defendants' rights.

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) prohibits any state party from transferring its nationals to a country where they are at risk of being sentenced to death. However, Iraq has already prosecuted many foreigners for terrorist crimes in the last few years – many of those convicted have been sentenced to death, without any execution yet. The French government faced widespread criticism after they transferred at least 11 Frenchmen to the Iraqi authorities in early 2019²².

To avoid the problem of the death penalty, European countries have considered the creation of an international court or a special chamber in order to provide at least minimal standards of due process, however both options are faced with challenges as neither the Syrian nor the Iraqi regimes will allow it, without high compensations. If an agreement includes payments on anything like this scale, prosecutions in Iraq could turn out to be a very expensive option for EU member states.²³

Analysis section

Who is vulnerable to violent extremism?

In other words, who is most at risk of radicalization? Violent extremism is a complex and multifactorial phenomenon. It is the embrace and violent expression of opinions, views, and ideas potentially leading an individual to join a terrorist group, organization or network. By being broad, the definition of violent

²¹ Schuk, Nathalie. "Jean-Yves Le Drian : 'L'Europe Est En Danger.'" Leparisien.fr, 2019.

²² AFP, Le Monde. "Irak : Les Deux Derniers Français Jugés Pour Appartenance à L'EI Également Condamnés à Mort." Le Monde.fr, 2019.

²³ Sallon, Hélène, et al. "L'offensive Turque Relance La Question Des Djihadistes Étrangers Détenus En Syrie." Le Monde.fr, 2019.

extremism may result in indiscriminate repressive measures being taken against all those who are considered to hold extremist views²⁴.

Anyone can be exposed to radical ideology through his community, religion, socioeconomic status, in prisons or even through his local authority, however not everyone is prone to connect to those ideologies.

Children, from all kinds of backgrounds and teenagers can be slowly radicalized. Their vulnerability can come from family issues, experience of trauma or racism or even a low self-esteem.

Teenagers are at greater risk because they are more independent to find their own identity and faith. Young Muslims of migrant origin are vulnerable to violent extremism. For many of them, whether integrated or not, have a feeling that they are not fully accepted. For example, a French citizen of Algerian descent can still be perceived as an Algerian and therefore a Muslim. Some feel torn apart between a country they identify as their home and their country of origin. Lack of opportunities and job discriminations are also a reason of radicalization. Young Muslims, searching for a mission and exposed to the suffering inflicted by the West toward parts of the Arab and Muslim world, can become self-radicalized and fanatically religious, breaking off from their families and friends and embodying a 'generation rupture'.

Prisoners are vulnerable to violent extremism. Imprisonment is an aggravating factor of social exclusion and a context of violence in general. In France, there is a will to regroup radicalized in order to control them and to put an end to the pressure they would exert on others, however this can be counterproductive, as no exit mechanism exists. The placement in such unit – surrounded by radicalized people and with a lack of family contacts – leave a small window for reintegration, especially when the criteria to put a prisoner in such unit can be broad. Some studies suggest that there is no direct cause and effect relationship between having been incarcerated and being in prison now for acts of terrorism.

Radicalization is a gradual process and the one exposed to it may not realize what is happening. In this sense, women's involvement in violent extremism remains underestimated. However, we know today that 17% of European foreign fighters are women. Historically, women have been involved in violent organization. There is a diversity in the profiles of women becoming radicalized. Most of the female recruits came from religiously moderate Muslim families, while some

²⁴ Winter, David A. European Union, 2017, The Role of the Sub-National Authorities from the Mediterranean Region in Addressing Radicalisation and Violent Extremism of Young People.

converted to Islam at a later age²⁵. Women join terrorist groups for the same reasons as men: clusters, socioeconomic context, desire for action, personal reason, but also due to gender-based inequality and discrimination, as the OSCE has highlighted²⁶.

How government policies and strategies affect the 2nd and 3rd generation in terms of identity, alienation etc.? How are those generation treated in the context of countering terrorism policies?

After the Madrid and London attacks, old integration models were abandoned for a better integration. Germany relaxed its naturalization policy and so did Britain, however, France stayed attached to its secular model.

Are European Muslims discriminated? Should European states be held responsible? With the amplification of xenophobic feelings and Islamophobia in some sectors of society comes a risk of translation of such feelings within European policies – in regards we can talk about the Burqa crisis in France. With the increasing numbers of Europeans joining terrorist groups, immigrant descents are becoming even more marginalized and question with respect of their loyalty, thus increasing their lack of appurtenance toward a European identity.

One has to admit, that despite all the cruelty in the world, Islamist violence has surpassed all other forms of faith related violence, not in terms of magnitude but in terms of ‘theatricalisation’ of jihadi violence²⁷. The Muslim demographic is becoming a central theme in political debates, as right-wing parties are depicting Muslims as the main issue in Europe²⁸. For many, this is also true as Europeans greatly overestimate the share of Muslims in the total population (around 6% in France and 4% in Germany).

Since the first attacks in the continent, study centers and policies have been adopted to counter violent extremism, through the integration of intercultural dialogues – in France known as *Le Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* – or the appointment of Muslim ministers in government cabinets. All European states have adopted measures in response to terrorism: stricter surveillance, prevention of radicalization in prisons and mosques, promotion of diversity, re-assertion, training of imams. But those measures seem insufficient, as EU policies are

²⁵ Orav, Anita. European Parliamentary Research ServiceE, 2018, Radicalisation and Counter- Radicalisation: A Gender Perspective.

²⁶ OSCE Secretariat, 2013, The Role and Empowerment of Women in Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism.

²⁷ Wattles, Alison. 2018, Islamist Radicalization in France Since the Algerian War. The University of Washington.

²⁸ Khader, Bichara. “Muslims in Europe: The Construction of a ‘Problem.’” OpenMind, Catholic University of Louvain, 2016.

forgetting their democratic values to conduct their fight outside and inside of their borders (allowing Iraqi Shiite domination, intrusion in Libya, the lack of reconnaissance of Palestine etc.).

Today Islamophobia is not only manifested through individuals but also through policies and practices:

- Legislation that indirectly target Muslims or restrict their freedom of religion. The French government plans to harden French law against Radical Islamism.
- Discrimination in education or employment.
- Profiling and police abuse.
- Public discourse by politicians that stigmatize Muslims.

Islamophobia is a ‘symptom of the disintegration of human values’, according to former Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas Hammarberg. It is difficult to find a balance between the protection of human rights and the fight against terrorism. Human rights have become flexible in order to counter-terrorism:

- The right of life through the imprisonment and trials of European citizens in Iraq.
- Freedom of expression and association through the prohibition of certain discourse.
- Right of privacy through the growth of surveillance.
- Principle of non-discrimination through profiling to detect the radicalized.

Restricting human rights – in the pursuance of a legitimate purpose – toward a certain population, in Europe can be counterproductive as it accentuates the feeling of alienation. Muslim immigrants – from different national origins – were originally welcomed in Europe as vital contributors to the workforce. Today, their descents are citizens of Europe and the vast majority of Muslim youth only want what any teenager will want: to fit in. Even if they do not want to ignore their religious traditions, they feel strongly tied to the countries they live in. Many of them, have never left Europe, or been to the country of their parents’ origins.

Terrorism propaganda toward 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants in Europe

Modern migration movements can become an issue as it can increase transnational organized crime. Terrorist organization members are trying to infiltrate Europe and influence the 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants who are lacking a sense of European identity. Extremist groups often target young people via the internet and social media:

- Psychological manipulation
- Sharing violent material and information
- Exploitation etc.

Terrorist networks have an organized online propaganda. For example, in 2015 the Hiraj to Islamic State was published to provide practical advice for preparation. This was not the first nor the last recruitment manual. In those manuals, women are also included and advised.

When an individual is not self-recruited or self-radicalized, recruiters represent an important link between terrorist groups and individuals. Propaganda is not limited to the internet but is also established within the European ground, through mosques and prisons. Mosques are not only a center for worship, but also a host of educational activities. Mosques are not only open to pray, but also open to groups and associations to organize activities or classes, with a risk to become a hub of extremist activities. However, the government control of mosques has decreased the recruitment inside of them. Terrorist organization members are also infiltrating prisons. In the context of prisons, religion provides a sense of security and faith, thus increasing religious and Islamic discussions.

Recruitment can take place anywhere where an individual is vulnerable (prisons, detention centers, schools) or where an individual is surrounded by its peers (mosques, cafes, gyms, summer camps etc.)²⁹

Findings

While mass media continues to treat 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants as foreigners, it is not the case anymore. For instance, in France, most of them are today French citizens who were born and raised within Europe.

Most of them are torn between their roots outside of the European borders and their education within the European borders. Europeans, of Muslim origins, have difficulties to fit in as they are not completely accepted and assimilated.

European, of Muslim origins, have therefore a will to learn more about their roots and Islam. They are willing to absorb what Mosques teaches are given them – taking it as true Islam, without ever questioning it.

It is important to understand how Mosques are funded in order to understand what the 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants are learning inside of them. It is also important to distinguish between what is true Islam and Radicalism, in order to understand how this phenomenon can be reversed.

²⁹ Neumann, Peter R. 2007, Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe . King's College London.

As no European government are stepping in to fund Mosques, most of them are funded by countries outside of Europe, thus letting those countries control how the Mosques are functioning.

Through Mosques and Charity organizations, outside countries found a way to recruit terrorists. By feeding the marginalized, they found a way to make them work on their own interests. For example, the Qatar Charity was accused by the United Kingdom of suspicions of terrorist financing. This same association was also responsible of the funding of many Mosques, like on in Poitiers, France, in 2019.

The European Union needs to understand the distinction between Islam and Extremism as well as the vulnerability of 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants in order to decrease the propaganda of far right parties against Europeans of Muslim origins – a propaganda dangerous of its own existence as far right parties are against the founding of the EU.

Recommendation section

European policies might not be the only reason why a part of 2nd and 3rd generations immigrants are joining terrorist groups, but they are the only legal mean to ensure proper assimilation and socioeconomic integration for these generation.

There is neither a single pathway to radicalization nor a single terrorist profile, therefore it is difficult to establish proper policies to properly counter terrorism without alienating a great part of the population. Despite its effort to counter radicalization, France has the largest european contributor to terrorist fighters in Iraq or Syria. The government is failing to avoid this tendency, as many immigrants that gained citizenship are still perceived as guests rather than permanent citizens.

Countering terrorism can be done through different levels:

- Immigration policy is an effective against a host country.
- Better integration of new generations as a way to decrease their chances of joining terrorist groups. Help change the misconception that youth are perpetrators or a burden on society.
- Need to enhance the youth participation in decision making³⁰.
- Distinction between extremist beliefs and terrorist actions.
- Stop systematic imprisonment as it does not help monitor radicalized prisoners.

³⁰ Winter, David A. *op cit*.

- Not significant to create a policy stereotyping and targeting only Muslim communities as it might have the opposite effect.
- Acknowledging the role of women in the enrolment by creating gender approach security strategies.
- Introducing women to prevent radicalization³¹.
- Repatriating detained ISIS supporters, to ensure fair trials and conduct information they possess to learn more about terrorist networks. It is the best way to remain under control and to guarantee an end toward further radicalization in detention camps especially in Syria.
- Need to priorities resocialization and reintegration rather than incarceration.
- Focus on child trauma.

Conclusion

Who should take care of the lost generation of children of European terrorists?

Children of European terrorists, either born in Europe or outside, should be considered as second generations of terrorist and not be treated the same way as their parents. Some children are radicalized at an early age and learn how to fight before the age of 9, others face psychological trauma. Children are usually more ideologically committed as the terrorist community is the only entity they know and have experienced.

European leaders and officials acknowledge that, even though some children may pose some degree of threat, they should be seen above all as victims³². European governments without ignoring the intentions of returnees or detainees, should therefore introduce proper policies to re-integrate these 'lost generation'.

³¹ Orav, Anita. *op cit*.

³² Fellow, Anthony Dworkin Senior Policy, et al. "Beyond Good and Evil: Why Europe Should Bring ISIS Foreign Fighters Home." ECFR, 2019.

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