Sara Kira
Geopolitical Analyst
Abstract
This article examines three distinct models of regional influence that continue to shape global power dynamics: the American Monroe Doctrine, Russia’s “Near Abroad” doctrine, and China’s implicit, non-declaratory approach to foreign policy expansion. While differing in historical context, rhetoric, and instruments, all three doctrines are rooted in a common strategic concern: the control of geographic proximity as a determinant of national security and international hierarchy. The article argues that contemporary global competition is not marked by the disappearance of spheres of influence, but by their transformation—from overt territorial and military domination toward structural, economic, and institutional power. This transformation has direct implications for strategically vital regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, placing Egypt at the center of an increasingly complex geopolitical equation.
Keywords: Monroe Doctrine, Near Abroad, China Foreign Policy, Spheres of Influence, Red Sea Security, Horn of Africa, Egypt
Introduction
International politics has never been governed solely by norms, laws, or moral commitments. At its core, it has always revolved around space—who controls it, who influences it, and who is excluded from it.
Throughout modern history, great powers have articulated doctrines that translate geography into security strategy. These doctrines are not merely policy statements; they are reflections of how states conceptualize threat, hierarchy, and order. In the twenty-first century, despite repeated claims about the end of spheres of influence, great powers continue to organize their external behavior around them—albeit in evolving forms.
This article offers a comparative analysis of three influential models: the American Monroe Doctrine, Russia’s Near Abroad doctrine, and China’s undeclared yet operational approach to regional and global influence. It situates these models within a broader transformation of international order and assesses their implications for regions where strategic competition converges—most notably the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
I. The Monroe Doctrine: Exclusion as a Strategic Principle
The Monroe Doctrine, articulated by U.S. President James Monroe in 1823, declared the Western Hemisphere closed to further European colonization or intervention. Officially framed as a defensive measure to protect newly independent Latin American states, the doctrine functioned in practice as an early assertion of American regional primacy.¹
Over time, particularly with the introduction of the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904, the doctrine evolved from a political warning into a mechanism of enforcement. The United States assumed the right to intervene militarily and politically across Latin America to preserve order, protect its interests, and prevent external influence.²
Thus, sovereignty in the hemisphere became conditional—recognized formally, yet constrained strategically. The Monroe Doctrine institutionalized exclusion as the core logic of American regional power: security was achieved not through coexistence, but through the prevention of rival presence.³
II. Russia’s “Near Abroad”: Security Through Strategic Depth
Russia’s Near Abroad doctrine emerged in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, a moment that dramatically reduced Moscow’s territorial depth and geopolitical buffers. For Russian strategic thinking, this contraction was not merely a loss of influence, but a direct threat to national survival.⁴
The Near Abroad refers to former Soviet republics, which Russia views as zones of privileged interest due to historical ties, security considerations, and economic interdependence. Unlike the Monroe Doctrine, which relies heavily on institutional dominance and global legitimacy, Russia’s approach is grounded in existential security logic.⁵
From Moscow’s perspective, the alignment of neighboring states with hostile military alliances undermines Russia’s strategic stability. This worldview has repeatedly brought Russia into confrontation with the prevailing international order, particularly regarding the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.⁶
III. China: Influence Without a Doctrine
China represents a fundamentally different model of power projection. Unlike the United States or Russia, Beijing has not articulated a formal doctrine defining exclusive regions or red lines. Instead, Chinese foreign policy emphasizes principles of non-interference, mutual benefit, and development cooperation.⁷
Yet this absence of declaratory doctrine does not imply the absence of strategy. Through infrastructure investment, trade integration, long-term financing, and supply-chain dominance, China exercises structural power—shaping the economic choices and dependencies of partner states.⁸
In Latin America, China does not challenge the Monroe Doctrine through military presence or ideological confrontation. Rather, it gradually erodes its relevance by embedding itself within critical sectors such as energy, ports, telecommunications, and logistics. Influence is achieved not through exclusion, but through indispensability.⁹
IV. Comparative Framework: Three Logics of Power
A comparative reading of these doctrines reveals three distinct grammars of influence:
The United States practices power through exclusion, enforcement, and institutional control.
Russia practices power through security depth, deterrence, and coercive capability.
China practices power through economic entanglement and long-term structural integration.
Despite their differences, all three models share a common assumption: geographic proximity matters, and unmanaged proximity constitutes vulnerability. The divergence lies not in objectives, but in methods.¹⁰
V. Implications for the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and Egypt
The evolution of spheres of influence is most visible in regions where strategic routes, maritime corridors, and fragile states intersect. The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea have become arenas where American, Russian, and Chinese logics overlap rather than replace one another.¹¹
In this space, influence is no longer exercised solely through military bases or formal alliances, but through ports, infrastructure, energy routes, and political mediation. This transformation has direct implications for Egypt, whose national security is inseparable from Red Sea stability and the preservation of state sovereignty in its southern and eastern periphery.
For Cairo, the fragmentation of states, the legitimization of secessionist entities, or the militarization of maritime chokepoints represents a direct threat. Egypt’s strategic posture reflects an understanding that modern influence is structural—and that defending national security requires engagement not only with military threats, but with economic and geopolitical reconfiguration.¹²
Conclusion
The contemporary international system is not witnessing the end of spheres of influence, but their mutation. The Monroe Doctrine, the Near Abroad, and China’s undeclared strategy each represent adaptive responses to the same enduring question: how can power secure itself in an interconnected yet competitive world?
As influence shifts from overt domination to structural penetration, regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea will increasingly determine the balance between stability and fragmentation. Egypt’s role in this environment is not peripheral—it is central.
Understanding these doctrines, therefore, is not an academic exercise alone. It is a strategic necessity in a world where power speaks less loudly, but reaches far deeper.
References
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